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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
PETER G. CONDAS, 
Plaintiff arnd Appella;nt, 
-vs.-
SUGARHOUSE ~1ERCANTILE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant a.nd Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9657 
Plaintiff's Brief On Appeal 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to quiet title to an 
undivided one-half interest to certain real property and 
to partition said property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Prior to trial, the defendant in the above entitled 
case moved for summary judgment. Said motion was 
granted by the trial court. Plaintiff now appeals from 
the summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasasmuch as the trial court disposed of this case 
on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff is en-
titled for the purpose of this appeal to have the facts 
considered in the light most favorable to him. See Abdul-
kidir v. Western Pacific Railroad, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 
2d 339. With this rule in mind, the files, records and 
affidavits herein show the following facts: 
On May 19th, 1948, the plaintiff, Peter G. Condas, 
obtained a tax deed from Salt Lake County, covering the 
property in question (R. 17). Sugarhouse Mercantile 
Company, the defendant in this action, and R. J. Fry, 
Inc., were the record title owners of the property. 
After the issuance of the tax deed, Sugarhouse Mer-
cantile Company filed an action to quiet title in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, Case No. 80371. Salt 
Lake County, Peter G. Condas, Mrs. Peter G. Condas and 
R. J. Fry Company were named party defendants to 
said suit (R. 22 and 23). The case was tried and judg-
ment entered in favor of the tax title claimant on Feb-
ruary 6, 1950 (R. 46); thereafter, an appeal was taken 
to the Utah Supreme Court and on December 26, 1950, 
the judgment was reversed by a per c~riam decision of 
the Court (R. 46). The complete decision of the Supreme 
Court is as follows: (119 Utah 235, 225 P. 2d, 1050) 
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''IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sugarhouse Mercantile Company, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Salt Lake County and R. J. Fry, No. 7487 
Incorporated, Peter G. Condas and 
Mrs. Peter G. Condas, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is controlled by our decision in the 
case of Toronto v. Sheffield, ______ Utah ______ , 222 P. 
2d 594, in which Section 104-2-5.-0, Laws of Utah, 
1943, was held to be unconstitutional. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause re-
manded with instructions to grant a new trial 
wherein defendants may present their claims for 
the amounts they have paid to the county for this 
property as a condition of quieting appellant's 
title thereto. Appellant shall recover its costs on 
appeal.'' 
After the case was reversed and remanded by the 
Supreme Court, the rehearing was eventually held and 
judgment finally entered on November 3, 1958 (R. 23). 
After the original trial of the above-mentioned case 
and during the time the case was pending on appeal, 
plaintiff Peter G. Condas acquired title to the same prop-
erty from another source. On October 20, 1950, plain-
tiff received a quit claim deed to the property from R. J. 
Fry, Inc. (R. 37). 
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Although R. J. Fry, Inc. had been named a party to 
all of the litigation, it had never been properly joined in 
the suit nor served with process. Thus the findings of 
fact and final decree in the case expressly provided "that 
the defendant R. J. Fry, Inc. was not served with sum-
mons and that no appearance was entered for them and 
no judgment is entered for them" (R. 22). 
In this new action, the plaintiff, Peter G. Condas, 
has filed suit to quiet title, claiming to be the successor 
to the interest of R. J. Fry, Inc. 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this 
action was wrongfully granted on principles of res 
judicata. 
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
PoiNT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM AS-
SERTING HIS NEW TITLE ACQUIRED BY 
VIRTUE OF A DEED OBTAINED AFTER 
THE TRIAL OF THE FIRST CASE. 
PoiNT II. 
A JUDGMENT CANNOT BE HES JUDICATA 
AS TO MATTERS WHICH THE COURT EX-
PHESSLY REFUSES TO DETER11INE. 
PoiNT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BAHRED FROM AS-
SERTING HIS ORIGINAL TAX TITLE 
AGAINST THE INTEHEST OF R. J. FRY, INC. 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FRO:NI AS-
SERTING HIS NEW TITLE ACQUIRED BY 
VIRTUE OF A DEED OBTAINED AFTER 
THE TRIAL OF THE FIRST CASE. 
The judgment of the trial Court was erroneously 
based upon the assumption that Peter G. Condas failed 
to assert all of his claims to title in the prior action. 
Plaintiff does not dispute or take issue with the well 
established body of law, holding that a party litigant is 
concluded in a subsequent action not only as to matte·rs 
actually raised in the first action, but to all other issues 
which could have he·en raised (See Todaro v. Gardn,er, 3 
Utah 2d 404, 285 P. 2d 839; Loga;n City v. Utah Power & 
Light, 86 Utah 340, 16 P. 2d 1097; C.J.S. Judgments, 
Section 731). 
Plaintiff could not have asserted his title in the first 
action. He did not get a deed to the property until Octo-
ber 20, 1950. This was approximately 9 months after 
the case was decided by the District Court. It would 
clearly have been impossible to assert title in the prior 
action under a conveyance which was not yet in existence. 
Defendant successfully argued in the trial court that 
the new title could, and should have been asserted at the 
rehearing of the first case after the appeal had been de-
cided. This was the argument which apparently per-
suaded the trial court to grant defendant's motion for 
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summary judgment. This argument may have had merit 
if the Supreme Court in the first case had granted a 
complete new trial; such, however, was not the case. The 
decision was reversed and a new trial granted only for 
a restricted purpose - that is to determine the amounts 
paid by the tax title claimant for which he was entitled to 
reimbursement as a condition to the quieting of the rec-
ord owner's title. Such procedure would naturally be 
required under Section 59-1-65, Utah Code Annotated, 
which gives the purchaser of an invalid tax title a lien 
on the property to the extent of the amount of taxes, 
penalties and interest actually paid. 
It has generally been held by the Courts that where 
a cause is remanded to the trial court for a restricted 
purpose, the pleadings may not be amended unless the 
amendment concerns the purposes for which the cause 
was remanded. Consolidated Stone Company v. Heiden-
bach, 180 Okla. 128, 114 P. 2d 480; Jorgensen v. Bigelow, 
37 Idaho 541, 217 Pac. 265; C.J.S. Appeal and Error, 
Section 1969 ( 5). 
Under the above rule of law, plaintiff could not have 
asserted his title at the rehearing even if he had attempt-
ed to do so. The rehearing was for the sole purpose of 
establishing the extent of the tax title claimant's lien. 
Thus, plaintiff has never had a previous opportunity to 
assert his title based upon the deed from R. J. Fry, Inc. 
and the action to quiet title herein was properly filed. 
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PoiNT II. 
A JUDGMENT CANNOT BE RES JUDICATA 
AS TO MATTERS WHICH THE COURT EX-
PRESSLY REFUSES TO DETERMINE. 
In Todaro v. Ga.rdner, 3 Utah 2d 401, 285 P. 2d 839, 
the Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that a judgment 
cannot be res judicata as to any matters which the Court 
expressly refuses to determine. 
The findings of fact and decree of the prior case 
here expressly recite that only the "interest" of Sugar-
house Mercantile Company in the property is quieted as 
against the defendants in the action. Both the findings 
and decree specifically state, that R. J. Fry, Inc. was not 
served with process and no judgment is entered as to the 
interest of the corporation. 
Inasmuch as the Court expressly refused to deter-
mine the interest of R. J. Fry, Inc., the successor to the 
corporation, to-wit the plaintiff herein, cannot be barred 
from asserting his title. 
PoiNT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED FROM AS-
SERTING HIS ORIGINAL TAX TITLE 
AGAINST THE INTEREST OF R. J. FRY, INC. 
Even if plaintiff had not obtained a deed from R. J. 
Fry, Inc., this action could still be maintained on the 
basis of his original tax title. 
The first case in the Supreme Court was reversed 
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because the tax title was defective. Since· the time of the 
Supreme Court decision, however, the Utah State Leg-
islature has passed a valid Statute of Limitations which 
prevents the questioning of the validity of a tax title 
afrter a period of four years. See 78-12-5.2 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. This statute has been upheld 
as constitutional (Ha;nsen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 
P. 2d 884). 
Inasmuch as the interest of R. J. Fry, Inc., was not 
adjudicated in the first action, plaintiff would be entitled 
to assert his tax title against said intere·st, the Statute 
of Limitation having now run against R. J. Fry, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to reverse 
the decision of the trial Court. 
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, 
RAWLINGS & WEST 
DAVID E. WEST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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